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A Quantitative Measure of Theoretical Scientific Merit
Bruce Knuteson∗
Program review in the physical sciences may benefit from a framework within which to quan-
titatively discuss the scientific merit of a proposed theoretical program of research, and to assess
the scientific merit of a particular theoretical paper. This article interprets a previously proposed
measure of experimental scientific merit in a manner appropriate for quantifying the scientific merit
of completed and proposed theoretical research. With this interpretation, the resulting figure of
merit represents a proposal for a quantitative measure of total scientific merit.
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I. MOTIVATION
A quantitative measure of experimental scientific merit
was proposed in Ref. [1]. This article shows that the
same measure, appropriately interpreted, can be used as
a quantitative measure of theoretical scientific merit. The
measure, encompassing both experimental and theoreti-
cal scientific merit, is thus a proposed measure of total
scientific merit.
In the context of determining which research programs
to pursue, review committees often must decide the rela-
tive scientific merits of proposed research directions, both
experimental and theoretical. Similar decisions are made
at all levels, charting directions for entire fields, for large
collaborations, for individual university groups, and for
individual scientists, and over timescales ranging from
a decadal plan for a field to how an individual scien-
tist chooses to allocate her next hour of research time.
These issues arise in the discussion of research directions
in which the result is not yet known.
A related issue is faced by those assessing the scientific
merit of a particular theoretical or experimental paper.
This topic is the subject of much innocuous lunchroom
conversation, and more seriously in the evaluation of the
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organizations and individuals responsible for producing
the result. Even in the most quantitative subfields in the
physical sciences, the discussions leading to these deci-
sions and evaluations are notably non-quantitative.
If direct technological applications are possible, the rel-
evant figure of merit should be something like number of
lives saved, tons of reduced carbon emissions, or mon-
etary profit. This article does not address science with
immediate technological implications. The figure of merit
constructed in this article is designed to assess theoret-
ical developments whose technological implications are
sufficiently remote to be highly uncertain, leaving their
primary short term benefit to be scientific rather than
technological.
To make this article self-contained, Section II briefly
reviews the quantitative measure of experimental scien-
tific merit previously proposed in Ref. [1]. Section III
presents an interpretation in which the measure proposed
in Ref. [1] can also be used to quantify theoretical scien-
tific merit. Section IV provides examples showing how
this figure of merit can be applied. Section V discusses
potential advantages of adopting this figure of merit in
practice. Section VI summarizes.
II. REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL SCIENTIFIC
MERIT
The essential idea of Ref. [1] is that the value of a par-
ticular experimental result in an academic field should
be measured by how much is learned from the result.
Equivalently, the value of a result is how surprised you
are that the particular result has been obtained. An ex-
periment confirming an effect already predicted with high
confidence does not teach us much, while an experiment
producing an unanticipated result can teach us a great
deal. Section II of Ref. [1] develops this basic idea into
a quantitative measure of experimental scientific merit,
borrowing elementary concepts from information theory.
Adopting the notation of Ref. [1], let Y =
{y1, . . . , yj, . . . , ym} denote a set of qualitatively distinct
and mutually incompatible states of knowledge, the jth
of which is generally accepted to be correct with prob-
ability p(yj), and let X = {x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn} denote
possible outcomes of an experiment, the ith of which is
expected to be realized with probability p(xi) [4]. Since
the process of normal science relies to a significant de-
2gree on a scientific community’s shared view of impor-
tant problems and possible solutions, in practice there is
little difficulty defining X and Y [2]. The sets X and
Y are assumed to be complete and their individual el-
ements orthogonal, so that p(xi1 , xi2) = p(yj1 , yj2) = 0
and
∑
i p(xi) =
∑
j p(yj) = 1 [5].
The evidence the result xi provides in favor of the state
of knowledge yj is
evidence(yj |xi) = log10
p(yj |xi)
p(yj)
. (1)
Since in practice the state of knowledge yj is not known
to be correct, the scientific merit of obtaining the exper-
imental result xi is the evidence the result xi provides
in favor of yj , averaged over possibly correct states of
knowledge yj, weighted according to the current expec-
tation that each yj is correct. The scientific merit of the
experimental result xi is thus the information gain, where
information gain (xi) =
∑
j
p(yj |now) evidence(yj |xi)
=
∑
j
p(yj |now) log10
p(yj |xi)
p(yj)
,(2)
denoting by p(yj |now) the current expectation that yj
is correct. Immediately after the result xi is obtained,
p(yj |now) = p(yj |xi). The scientific merit of an experi-
ment not yet performed is the expected value of the sci-
entific merit of its potential results,
∆H =
∑
i
p(xi) information gain (xi)
=
∑
i,j
p(yj , xi) log10
p(yj |xi)
p(yj)
, (3)
where ∆H denotes the expected decrease in information
entropy associated with the states of knowledge Y upon
performing the experiment X .
Further derivation and discussion are provided in Sec-
tion II of Ref. [1].
III. THEORETICAL SCIENTIFIC MERIT
The experimental figure of merit assumes a complete
set of possible states of knowledge Y . An experimental
outcome xi adjusts the belief p(yj) that each state of
knowledge yj is correct.
Similarly, the theoretical figure of merit proposed in
this article assumes a complete set of possible states of
knowledge Y . A theoretical result xi adjusts the belief
p(yj) that each state of knowledge yj is correct. The
theoretical figure of merit proposed in this article is thus
the same as the experimental figure of merit proposed in
Ref. [1], with appropriately interpreted xi.
It is worth emphasizing that in the proposed figure of
merit, a theoretical paper does not obtain its value by
extending Y , which by assumption is a complete set. A
theoretical paper obtains its value by articulating reasons
for adjusting beliefs that some subset of states of knowl-
edge are correct, based on simplicity or agreement with
existing data.
Any serious proposal for quantifying theoretical sci-
entific merit must satisfy a basic property of self con-
sistency: the sum of the merits of two separate papers
containing a body of experimental and/or theoretical re-
sults must equal the merit of a single paper containing
the same body of results. Current popular proxies for sci-
entific merit, such as number of publications and number
of citations, violate this basic property of self consistency.
The figure of merit proposed in this article uniquely satis-
fies this desired additive property, which is used as the ba-
sis of the derivation of the experimental figure of merit in
Ref. [1]. This additive property allows the figure of merit
to be divided by cost to obtain a well-defined “bang per
buck,” quantifying scientific value per dollar of funding.
The bang per buck can in turn be used in the research
portfolio allocation problem faced at all levels in the sci-
entific enterprise.
With the value of both experimental and theoretical re-
sults arising from how they change beliefs on the set Y ,
the figure of merit proposed in this article allows a quan-
titative comparison of the scientific merit of experimental
results with the scientific merit of theoretical results.
IV. EXAMPLES
Three short examples will serve to clarify the proposed
figure of merit.
Let SM denote the particle physics Standard Model,
believed to be correct with probability p(SM) = 1/2. A
new theoretical paper x articulates a model H, pointing
out consistency with existing experimental data and not-
ing certain elegant features. The model H comes out of
left field; no other person has published along remotely
similar lines. The prior expectation p(H) that H is the
correct model, corresponding to your belief if someone
were to describe the outline of the idea to you on the
street without the supporting justification provided by
the paper, is taken to be p(H) = 10−10. The somewhat
arbitrary choice of p(H) = 10−10, which corresponds
roughly to giving every human being’s pet theory equal
weight, will not greatly affect the result. The sum of the
beliefs of all other models in Y is 1− p(SM)− p(H).
After the paper is absorbed by the field, the model H
is believed to be correct with probability p(H|x) = ǫ, the
Standard Model is believed to be correct with probability
p(SM|x) = 1/2− (ǫ − 10−10), and the sum of the beliefs
of all other models in Y is unchanged. Assuming 1 ≫
ǫ≫ 10−10, the information gain resulting from the paper
3x is
information gain(x) = p(SM|x) log10
p(SM|x)
p(SM)
+
p(H|x) log10
p(H|x)
p(H)
≈ ((1/2− ǫ)(−2ǫ log10 e) +
ǫ(10 + log10 ǫ)
≈ ǫ(9.6 + log10 ǫ), (4)
where terms of order ǫ2 and 10−10 have been dropped [6].
If the new model H is believed to be correct with proba-
bility p(H|x) = ǫ ≈ 10−4, then the scientific merit of the
paper calculated from Eq. 4 is roughly 6e-4 [7].
In this example, the scale of the scientific merit of the
paper x articulating the novel hypothesis H is set by the
posterior belief p(H|x) = ǫ that H is actually correct. A
multiplicative constant of order unity (equal to roughly
6 in this case) credits novelty. The theoretical scientific
merit of many proposed models in particle physics can
be calculated in this manner, using appropriate values of
ǫ.
The proposal that the scientific merit of a paper x ar-
ticulating a new hypothesis H should be closely related
to the posterior belief p(H|x) that H is actually correct
may seem strange to fields accustomed to using number
of citations as a proxy for scientific worth. The pro-
posed measure should however align with intuition af-
ter further reflection. Most scientists agree that simple
(elegant) theories are generally better than complicated
(ugly) theories, and that theories in agreement with exist-
ing data are generally better than those in disagreement
with existing data. Through Bayes’ theorem, simplicity
and fidelity are exactly the quantities that determine the
posterior belief. Alternatively, one can note that in the
end the whole point is getting the right answer. Any rea-
sonable figure of merit must therefore incorporate, prefer-
ably in as direct a manner as possible, the current belief
that the proposed hypothesis H is in fact the correct de-
scription of nature.
Consider as a second example a paper x describing an
improvement to calculation within the Standard Model
that results in closer agreement with existing experimen-
tal results. Such a paper x may increase the poste-
rior belief in the Standard Model from p(SM) = 1/2 to
p(SM|x) = 1/2 + ǫ by removing a discrepancy between
Standard Model prediction and data. This increased pos-
terior belief in the Standard Model comes at the expense
of alternative models H that had received attention in
part due to this discrepancy. The paper x has resulted
in the reduction of the summed belief of this set of alter-
native models from p(H) = ǫ to p(H|x) = ǫ′ ≪ ǫ. The
information gain resulting from the paper x is
information gain(x) = p(SM|x) log10
p(SM|x)
p(SM)
+
p(H|x) log10
p(H|x)
p(H)
≈ ((1/2 + ǫ)(2ǫ log10 e) +
ǫ′ log10
ǫ′
ǫ
≈ ǫ log10 e, (5)
where terms of order ǫ′ and ǫ2 have been dropped. If
the Standard Model after the paper x is believed to be
correct with probability p(SM|x) = 1/2 + ǫ = 51%, then
the scientific merit of the paper calculated from Eq. 5 is
roughly 4e-3.
In this example, the scale of the scientific merit of
the paper x articulating an improvement in calculating
within the Standard Model is set by the increased confi-
dence p(SM|x) − p(SM) = ǫ that the Standard Model is
actually correct. The theoretical scientific merit of many
calculational improvements within the particle physics
Standard Model can be determined in this way, using
appropriate values of ǫ.
As a historical example, consider two crucial occur-
rences in the development of general relativity: Einstein’s
theoretical developments up to 1917, and the 1919 expe-
dition led by Eddington that confirmed general relativ-
ity’s prediction for the deflection of starlight by the sun.
Expectations in this example are inferred from the his-
torical recounting of Ref. [3]; conclusions drawn should
be checked for robustness under reasonable variations in
these expectations. At the end of 1905, after the intro-
duction of special relativity but before the series of papers
culminating in the Einstein field equations, a person ap-
proaching you on the street and outlining the hypothesis
that would become general relativity would have been
believed with an expectation of p(GR|1905) ≈ 10−10.
Newtonian gravity was expected to be correct with ex-
pectation of p(Newton|1905) ≈ 99%, and with proba-
bility p(other|1905) ≈ 1% − 10−10 any of a number of
other possibilities might have been correct. After Ein-
stein’s papers, the scientific community remained skepti-
cal that general relativity was indeed a correct descrip-
tion of nature. The scientific community’s expectation
in 1917 that general relativity would prove to be correct
was p(GR|1917) ≈ 2%, leaving p(Newton|1917) ≈ 97%
and p(other|1917) ≈ 1%. Eddington’s 1919 measurement
of the bending of starlight around the sun at angles of
1.′′98± 0.′′30 at Sobral and Crommelin’s measurement of
1.′′61 ± 0.′′30 at Principe during the same eclipse were
found to be in significantly better agreement with gen-
eral relativity’s prediction of 1.′′74 than the Newtonian
prediction of 0.′′87. In the eyes of the scientific commu-
nity this experimental measurement significantly raised
the expectation that general relativity is the correct de-
scription of nature, resulting in p(GR|1919) ≈ 90%,
p(Newton|1919) ≈ 9%, and p(other|1919) ≈ 1% [8].
4Giving Einstein full credit for the changes in be-
liefs between 1905 and 1917, the theoretical scientific
merit of Einstein’s general relativity papers in 1917 was
information gain(Einstein, 1917) =
p(GR|1917) log10
p(GR|1917)
p(GR|1905)+
p(Newton|1917) log10
p(Newton|1917)
p(Newton|1905)+
p(other|1917) log10
p(other|1917)
p(other|1905) ≈ 0.2.
Giving Eddington full credit for the changes in be-
liefs between 1917 and 1919, the experimental scien-
tific merit of Eddington’s measurement in 1919 was
information gain(Eddington, 1919) =
p(GR|1919) log10
p(GR|1919)
p(GR|1917)+
p(Newton|1919) log10
p(Newton|1919)
p(Newton|1917)+
p(other|1919) log10
p(other|1919)
p(other|1917) ≈ 1.4.
Upon Eddington’s measurement in 1919, the theoreti-
cal scientific merit of Einstein’s contribution increased to
information gain(Einstein, 1919) =
p(GR|1919) log10
p(GR|1917)
p(GR|1905)+
p(Newton|1919) log10
p(Newton|1917)
p(Newton|1905)+
p(other|1919) log10
p(other|1917)
p(other|1905) ≈ 7.5.
The total scientific merit of Eddington and Einstein in
1919 was information gain(Eddington,Einstein, 1919) =
p(GR|1919) log10
p(GR|1919)
p(GR|1905)+
p(Newton|1919) log10
p(Newton|1919)
p(Newton|1905)+
p(other|1919) log10
p(other|1919)
p(other|1905) ≈ 8.9,
which is seen to be equal to the sum of Eddington’s and
Einstein’s individual scientific merits in 1919, as required
for self consistency.
This historical example raises several interesting
points. Increasing the belief of a new theory from ex-
tremely unlikely (p(GR|1905) ∼ 10−10) to very likely
(p(GR|1919) of order unity) is worth 10 points [9], dis-
tributed according to the evidence, either theoretical or
experimental, provided by each contributor. The scien-
tific merit of Einstein’s theoretical work increased sub-
stantially from 1917 to 1919 due to Eddington’s evidence
supporting general relativity’s prediction for the bending
of starlight by the sun, even though Einstein himself ar-
guably did not do much from 1917 to 1919. The increase
in the scientific merit of Einstein’s work after Eddington’s
result is consistent with Einstein’s worldwide fame for
general relativity coming after, rather than prior to, Ed-
dington’s measurement. Interestingly, the scientific merit
of Eddington’s measurement is within an order of magni-
tude of the scientific merit of Einstein’s theoretical devel-
opment, suggesting that Eddington deserves significantly
more credit than typically given in popular recountings
of the history of general relativity. Conclusions such as
these are robust under reasonable variations in estimated
expectations.
Ref. [1] provides a number of additional examples, us-
ing the same formalism to quantify the scientific merits
of specific completed and proposed particle physics ex-
periments.
V. DISCUSSION
The figure of merit proposed in this article is suffi-
ciently different from common practice in many fields
that a brief discussion of salient features may be help-
ful.
The figure of merit proposed in this article is well be-
haved. It is appropriately additive, in the sense that the
scientific merit of a single article containing two separate
results is equal to the sum of the scientific merits of two
different articles describing the results separately. Popu-
lar alternative proxies for merit, such as number of pub-
lications or number of citations, violate this basic prop-
erty of self consistency. This additive property allows the
proposed measure of theoretical merit to meaningfully be
divided by cost to obtain a measure of scientific bang per
buck that can be used directly to optimize a scientific
portfolio.
The proposed measure of theoretical scientific merit is
manifestly consistent with the measure of experimental
scientific merit previously proposed in Ref. [1]. This fig-
ure of merit thus constitutes a quantitative measure of to-
tal scientific merit, encompassing both experimental and
theoretical work. The figure of merit provides a frame-
work for quantitatively comparing the scientific merit of
theoretical and experimental results, for quantitatively
comparing the scientific merit of proposed theoretical re-
search with proposed experiments, and for optimizing a
scientific portfolio consisting of both experimental and
theoretical research. As a specific example, in most sub-
fields there has been little quantitative analysis into the
question of whether an increase in theoretical funding
relative to experimental funding (or vice versa) would
increase expected information gain. The figure of merit
proposed in this article provides a framework for such a
quantitative analysis.
Intelligent, conscious maximization of a particular fig-
ure of merit is expected to result in a world line with
higher values of that figure of merit than a world line in
which decisions are made according to other, possibly less
well defined, criteria. Intelligent, conscious maximization
of expected information gain is therefore expected to re-
sult in a world line with greater information gain than
a world line in which decisions are made according to
other, possibly less well defined, criteria.
Use of information content or information gain to eval-
uate the scientific merit of theoretical contributions re-
quires the estimation of beliefs that proposed theories are
5correct, and the reader may object that the problem of
quantifying a theoretical paper’s scientific merit has sim-
ply been reformulated in terms of the estimation of the
beliefs that theories are correct. At worst, this reformula-
tion significantly changes and focuses the discussion. The
fact that there is not a well-developed literature to point
to for the justification of these beliefs emphasizes the fact
that until now the importance of estimating these has
not been properly recognized in assessing the scientific
merit of theoretical contributions. In most cases, the sci-
entific conclusion drawn from this reformulation will be
robust against the variation of these beliefs within their
justifiable range. Tables I and II in Ref. [1] suggest that
experimental scientific merit per incremental unit cost
ranges over several orders of magnitude. A similar range
in theoretical scientific merit per incremental unit cost is
expected.
Some readers may object to the very idea of construct-
ing an explicit figure of merit to quantify the scientific
merit of theoretical contributions. These readers should
bear in mind that this already is done (implicitly, if not
explicitly) every time a decision of resource allocation or
promotion is made. In discussions of funding for pro-
posed research directions and recognition of completed
research directions, value judgments are made regarding
the theoretical scientific merit of proposals and results.
Such value judgments are a necessary part of the scien-
tific process. The question is therefore not whether the
theoretical scientific merit of proposals and results should
be determined, but rather how best to determine it. It
is surely in each field’s interest for such evaluations to be
made in the sharpest, most open, most quantifiable, and
scientifically best motivated framework possible.
Some readers may object to the specific figure of merit
advocated in this article. Scientists whose theoreti-
cal research scores higher under more traditional mea-
sures than under the measure proposed here may be ex-
pected to be among those voicing the strongest objec-
tions. These readers are challenged to find a scientifically
better motivated figure of merit.
VI. SUMMARY
This article interprets the unique measure of experi-
mental scientific merit developed in Ref. [1] in a manner
appropriate for quantifying theoretical scientific merit.
The choice of a reasonable quantitative figure of merit
for assessing the scientific merit of proposed theoreti-
cal research programs can inform and focus program re-
view and accompanying decisions of resource allocation
in many subfields of the physical sciences. The related
choice of a reasonable figure of merit for assessing the
scientific merit of any particular theoretical contribution
can inform the evaluation of those organizations and in-
dividuals responsible for its production.
This article advocates that the scientific merit of a
completed theoretical contribution should be quantified
by the extent to which it changes beliefs in the correct-
ness of competing candidate theories. Change in belief
of the correctness of competing candidate theories is an
elementary notion in the context of information theory,
quantified by information gain, defined in Eq. 2.
This article advocates that the amount of information
a program of research is expected to provide is the ap-
propriate quantity for assessing the scientific merit of any
proposed theoretical research direction. Expected infor-
mation gain is a well understood concept in information
theory, quantified by a change in information entropy
∆H , defined in Eq. 3.
The measure of theoretical scientific merit advocated
here, although developed with particle physics and cos-
mology foremost in mind, is expected to apply equally
to other physical sciences in which results may be far re-
moved from practical technological application. This fig-
ure of merit may provide a useful quantitative framework
within which decisions about future resource allocation
can be made.
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